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CREDIT MARKETS IN THE FISHERIES SECTOR UNDER THE 
COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM (CARP):
A REVIEW OF UTERATURE AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK*
Gilberto M. Llanto and Marife T. Magno**
I. INTRODUCTION
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the Aquino administration which 
was enacted into law under Republic Act 6657 is expected to bring about a great impact on Philippine 
subsistence agriculture. This is not surprising considering that the CARP encompasses the whole 
agricultural sector including fisheries, in contrast to the previous agrarian reform program, Presidential 
Decree (PD) No. 27, which covers only the rice and com sectors.
It is interesting to see the effect of employing a land reform program originally designed for the 
crop sector in the fisheries sector. While it may produce beneficial results, it may also bring about 
disruptive effects that could worsen existing problems in the industry.
One aspect of the fisheries industry that will likely be affected is the availability and accessibility 
of credit For example, because the fishing industry, specifically the small-scale fishery subsector, is 
faced with the problem of undercapitalization, an important issue to consider is whether the implemen­
tation of the CARP will improve credit access and availability. It is when banks generally prefer to 
finance big fishpond operators who can offer sufficient collaterals that the problem for the small 
fishpond operators becomes aggravated (TBAC 1976).
This implies that the opportunity to invest in the industry will be limited to those who can satisfy 
the collateral and other requirements of banks in view of the limitations of self-finance and/or informal 
credit The inability to invest and, for some, to expand investments and productivity in the industry will 
have spillover effects like increased pressure against stagnating municipal and coastal fisheries 
resources for more output and employment
The paper has the following objectives: (a) to review existing literature on fisheries credit 
markets in the Philippines, with a specific focus on the aquaculture subsector, (b) to identify critical 
issues and research gaps; and (c) to develop a framework of analysis for examining policy issues on
* Prepared for the Consultation Workshop on the Dynamics of Rural Development (DRD) organized by the Philippine 
Institute for Development Studies, held on August 30-31,1991, at Temate, Cavite. The woikshop is part of the Dynamics of 
Rural Development Research Program funded under the Technical Resources Project (TRP) of the United States Agency for Inter­
national Development (USAID) and coursed through the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA).
•♦Executive Director and Assistant Project Investigator, respectively. Agricultural Credit Policy Council (ACPC).
2fisheries (aquaculture) credit markets. The paper is structured as follows: Section II gives an overview 
of the fisheries industry in the Philippines. It focuses primarily on aquaculture since it is this subsector 
that will be directly affected by CARP. In Section IH the different features o f the aquaculture sector such 
as tenancy arrangements, productivity by farm size, and other basic microeconomic characteristics, as 
well as the structure of credit markets in the sector will be discussed. Section IV deals with credit policies 
and government intervention in the fisheries sector in the country. The last section concludes with an 
identification o f research priorities and gaps for further study.
H. THE PHILIPPINE FISHERIES INDUSTRY: AN OVERVIEW
A. The Fisheries Sector
The fisheries industry in the Philippines consists of three sectors, namely: (a) small-scale or 
municipal fisheries, (b) commercial fisheries, and (c) aquaculture.
Both municipal and commercial fisheries are categorized as marine fisheries differentiated in 
terms of boat tonnage, fishing gear and species captured. M unicipal fisheries utilize fishing boats 
weighing less than three gross tons and use simple fishing gear such as ring net, bag net or seine. Using 
gear alone without the use of boats is also possible. This sector is regarded as the most important among 
the fisheries sectors because it contributes, on the average, 50 percent of the total fisheries production 
and employs 68 percent of the one million workers in fisheries excluding those workers in ancillary 
industries (e.g., net making, repair of boats) (Tables 1 and 2).
In contrast to the municipal fisheries, the commercial fisheries sector uses boats weighing more 
than three gross tons and operates in waters more than seven fathoms deep using sophisticated equipment 
such as purse seine and trawlers. On the average, this sector accounts for 26 percent o f fisheries 
production and employs about six percent of the labor force in the fisheries industry.
Unlike the marine fisheries sector, aquaculture or fishfarming is more manageable since the 
breeding and culture of aquatic organisms can be controlled. This sector does not face problems of 
‘ ‘open-access’ ’ and resource degradation but is constrained by the unavailability of, and monopsonistic 
m arket for, inputs, particularly fry. Although, on the average, aquaculture contributes only 24 percent 
of total fisheries production and employs only about 26 percent of the labor force in the fisheries 
industry, the sector is considered one potential growth area in view of the declining productivity of 
marine resources. In particular, the fishpond industry (both brackishwater and freshwater) which 
supplies the bulk (45%) o f aquaculture production is expected to grow from a production of one ton per 
hectare to its maximum production capacity of two tons per hectare (Guerrero 1991).
The three sectors combined occupy a total area of about 221 million hectares including the 220- 
mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Coastal and oceanic water resources account for 99.5 percent of 
the total while inland water resources (Table 3) comprise the remaining balance (0.5%).
The importance of the fisheries industry in the economy is shown in its significant contribution 
to income, employment and export earnings. On the average, for the ten-year period covering 1980-90
Table 1
FISHERIES PRODUCTION BY SECTOR, 1981-90 
(In thousand metric tons)
Aquaculture Municipal Commercial
Total % to ----------------------------------- ------------------------
Year quantity total Quantity % to Quantity % to Quantity % to
total total total
1981 1,773 100 340 19.2 939 53.0 495 27.9
1982 1,897 100 392 20.7 978 51.6 526 27.7
1983 2,110 100 445 21.1 1,146 54.3 519 24.6
1984 2,080 100 478 23.0 1,089 52.4 513 24.7
1985 2,052 100 495 24.1 1,045 50.9 512 25.0
1986 2,089 100 471 22.5 1,072 51.3 546 26.1
1987 2,213 100 561 25.4 1,061 47.9 591 26.7
1988 2,270 100 600 26.4 1,070 47.1 600 26.4
1989 2,371 100 629 26.5 1,105 46.6 637 26.9
1990“ 2,503 100 671 26.8 1,132 45.2 700 28.0
Total 21,358 100. 5,082 23.8 10,637 49.8 5,639 26.4
“Preliminary data from the Bureau o f Statistics.
Source: 1990 Philippine Fisheries Profile, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic 
Resources (BFAR).
Table 2
EM PLOYM ENT IN THE FISHERIES INDUSTRY BY SECTOR, 1990
Sector No. o f persons 
employed
% to 
total
Aquaculture 258,480“ 26.1
M unicipal fisheries 675,677b 68.2
Commercial fisheries 56,715“ 5.7
Total 990,872 100.0
* Source of data: Fisheries Statistics Sections, Bureau of Fisheries. 
b Source of data: 1980 Census of Fisheries.
Table 3
PHILIPPINE AQUATIC RESOURCES
Resources Area Percent
(in thousand ha) share
Total Aquatic Resources 220,826 100.0
Marine Resources 220,000 99.5
Coastal 26,600 12.0
Oceanic 193,400 87.5
Inland W ater Resources 826,000 0.5
Swamplands 338 0.2
Freshwater 106 —
Brackishwater 232 —
Fishpond 224 0.1
Freshwater 14 --
Brackishwater 210 —
Lakes 200 0.1
Rivers 31 —
Reservoir 19 --
Source: 1990 Philippine Fisheries Profile, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic 
Resources (BFAR).
5the sector accounts for five percent o f Gross National Product (GNP) at constant prices. Its contribution 
to the agricultural sector alone amounts to about 19 percent, the second highest contribution in that 
sector.
In terms of employment, the fisheries sector employs about a million individuals who comprise 
about five percent of the country’s labor force. This number is expected to increase with the development 
of the EEZ.
Fisheries have also made a dent as an export industry. The industry has had a positive balance 
of trade in fish and fishery products, contributing, on the average, five percent to the cpuntry’s export 
earnings for the period 1980-90.
Philippine exports of fish and fish products registered a record high of P I 1.53 billion in 1990, 
which is 42 percent and 31 percent higher than recorded exports in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The 
foreign exchange balance sheet for the sector suggests that approximately US$8 is generated for every 
US$1 expended. W hile the country also imports fish and fish products, notably frozen sardines and 
mackerel, fish meal and frozen tuna, this amount represents, on the average, only about nine percent of 
fish exports.
The major fish exports are prawns and shrimps followed by tuna and seaweed. Other products 
for export include shell craft articles, cuttlefish/squid, live fish, Capiz shells, milkfish, sea cucumber, 
and others (Table 4). Shrimps and prawns account for the dramatic increases in the country’s fish 
exports, with Japan, the United States and Canada absorbing most of these products. An interesting 
feature of the country’s shrimp industry is its predominantly aquaculture-based production compared 
to the w orld’s marine-based shrimp supply.
Tuna ranks second to shrimps among fish exports. About 55 thousand metric tons valued at P2.9 
million have been exported in 1990. Exports, however, show a volatile trend. Its share to total exports 
declined from 72 percent in 1981 to 46 percent in 1988, attributable mainly to the declining 
competitiveness of the tuna industry relative to other suppliers (e.g., Thailand) with lower production 
costs and better quality tuna.
Seaweeds, in contrast, are a promising export product. Exports of this product have been 
observed to be on the increase with Denmark as the major market. In 1990, seaweed exports amounted 
to 35 thousand metric tons valued at P1.2 million.
B. The Aquaculture Sector
Because of the land-based nature of aquaculture, in particular, the fishpond industry, it is this 
sector that will be directly affected by the CARP. To gauge the extent of such impact an understanding 
o f the economics o f aquaculture and o f the existing conditions that relate to tenancy arrangements, 
productivity and profitability as affected by farm size and ownership is essential.
6Table 4
PHILIPPINE EXPORTS OF FISH AND FISHERY PRODUCTS 
AND THE M AJOR COUNTRIES OF DESTINATION IN TERM S O F VALUE, 1990
Q u a n ti ty FOB V alue P e rc e n t
’Carrinodity /C o u n try (MT) ( I n  M ill io n S hare
P e so s ) To T o ta l
Shrim p/Praw n 25,205 5 ,434 47 .1
Jap an 19.492 4 ,258 3 6 .9
USA 3 ,882 808 7 .0
Guam 436 82 0 .7
Otlners 1,395 288 2 .5
Tuna 55,070 2 ,861 24 .8
Germany 12,254 528 5 .4
USA 13,016 590 5 .1
Jap an 9 ,389 547 4 .7
O t te r s 20,411 1,096 9 .5
Seaw eeds, d r i e d 35,346 1,192 10 .3
U n ited  Kingdon 3,961 274 2 .4
Denmark 10,676 130 1 .5
F rance 5 ,967 137 1 .2
O tte r s 14,742 601 5 .2
C u t t le f i s h /S q u id 3 ,225 378 3 .3
Japan 1,689 271 2 .4
USA 827 63 0 .5
Hongkong 489 30 0 .3
O tte r s 200 14 0 .1
S h fc l'Ic ra ft A r t i c l e s 1,823 301 2 .6
Germany 626 106 0 .9
Jap an 218 54 0 .5
I t a l y 310 36 0 .3
O t te r s 669 105 0 .9
F is h  K ept A liv e  f o r  T ra n s p o r t 5 ,800 157 1 .4
USA 2,307 81 0 .7
Taiwan 1,191 23 0 .2
Hongkong 224 18 0 .2
O th ers 14 34 0 .3
C ap is  S h e l l s 480 147 1 .3
USA 166 71 0 .6
Germany 90 32 0 .3
Canada 16 6 0 .5
O t te r s 208 38 0 .3
N a tu ra l and  C u ltu re d  P e a r ls 0 .158 102 0 .9
Hongkong 0 .097 80 0 .4
Jap an 0.060 22 0 .3
O t te r s 0.001 1
7T ab le  4 (c o n tin u a tio n )
Commodity /C o u n try
Q u a n ti ty
(MT)
FOB V alue 
( I n  M ill io n  
P eso s)
P e rc e n t  
S h are  
To T o ta l
Seaeucum ber (T repang) 1,751 80 0 .7
Hongkong 1,474 41 0 .4
K orea 169 31 0 .3
S in g ap o re 37 7 -
O th e rs 71 2 —
Bangus (M ilk f ish ) 668 62 0 .5
USA 601 44 0 .5
H aw aii 62 4 -
Guam 80 4 -
O th e rs 125 8 --
O th e r C oranod ities 13,471 813 7 .0
T o ta l 143,039 11,529 100.0
-  N e g lig ib le  
S o u rce : BFAR, F is h e r ie s  P r o f i l e ,  1990
81. Profile of the Aquaculture Industry
Aquaculture embraces a wide range of activities, carried out in water- or land-based areas. 
W ater-based areas involve culture in fishpens, fishcages or mariculture (i.e., culture o f oysters, mussels 
and seaweed) while land-based areas primarily involve culture in fishponds, both brackishwater and 
freshwater. As o f 1990, there were 237,438 hectares of fishpond in the country, of which 14,531 hectares 
were freshwater and 222,907 hectares brackishwater (Philippine Fisheries Profile, BFAR, 1990). 
Comparatively, the area covered by fishpens, fishcages and mariculture is minimal, totaling only 13,108 
hectares, of which 92 percent are considered as fishpen areas.
Fishponds generate, on the average, 24 percent of total fisheries production and provide 
em ployment to an estimated 150,000 workers. The industry is prim arily dominated by the culture of 
milkfish or bangus which accounts for 31.4 percent of aquaculture production by species, as compared 
to 11.5 percent for tilapia and 8.0 percent for shrimps and prawns (Table 5).
2. Industry Organization
Scale o f  operations. The aquaculture industry can be further classified in terms o f the size o f its 
operations, to wit: (a) small scale, (b) medium scale, and (c) corporate or large scale. Based on a 
socioeconomic survey o f the Philippine aquaculture industry (Table 6) the above classification is 
differentiated as follows: The small-scale operator has land areas varying from  a fraction of a hectare 
to at m ost 10 hectares. He usually manages alone or with the help of family members, or at most one or 
two casually-hired helpers. The farm uses traditional technology and relies on the natural productivity 
of water and land which results in relatively low production. The operator usually has lim ited schooling, 
leads a simple life, and has limited business opportunities.
A medium-scale operation, on the other hand, is characterized by bigger areas o f about 10 to 50 
hectares. The operator/owner usually has a high level o f education and is more aggressive in adopting 
new technology. Normally, production is three to four times higher than that of a small-scale operation.
In contrast to the small- and medium-scale operators, the large-scale or corporate operators 
manage fishponds of 50 or more hectares. They adopt a higher level o f technology, use skilled 
manpower, and produce high-valued outputs like prawns.
Ownership and tenure. There are three methods of granting sites for aquaculture purposes 
(Rabanal and Delmando 1988). These are through: (a) a government short- or long-term lease (i.e., 10 
to 25 years) which is renewable; (b) a title to the site after meeting certain conditions and after a certain 
period of time; and (c) a government concession granted for a specific privilege over a definite area for 
a given duration, for instance, milkfish fry collecting concessions in designated coastal waters. In the 
Philippines, the government lease is widely adopted although privately-owned fishponds dominate 
(Table 6Y A com bined tenurial arrangement (partly-owned and partly-leased) is also possible.
9Table 5
STATUS OF AQUACULTURE INDUSTRY, 1990
Quantity 
(in metric tons)
% to total
1. Production by Culture
Fishponds
Brackishwater 267,814 
Freshw ater 35,816
303,630 45.0
Fishpen 24,379 3.3
Fish cage 20,931 3.1
Mariculture 322,176 48.0
(oyster, mussel, seaweeds)
Total 671,116 100.0
2. Production by Species
Seaweeds 291,176 43.3
Bangus (milkfish) 210,882 31.4
Tilapia (cichlid) 76,142 11.5
Shimps/Prawns
- Tiger Prawns
- W hite Shrimps
- Endeavor Prawns
47,591
779
5,619
53,989 8.0
Mussel 17,515 2.6
Others 21,412 3.0
Total 671,116 100.0
Source: 1990 Philippine Fisheries Profile, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic 
Resources (BFAR).
Table ft
FEATURES OF T H E A Q U A C U L T U R E  INDUSTRY IN T H E PHILIPPINES 
SU M M A RY  O F FINDINGS FROM VARIOUS STUDIES
Author/Title 
(date of publication}
Sanple Size/ 
Location
Type of 
Aquaculture 
Industry Specie
Faro Size 
(has.)
Osnership Tenurial hrraagesent 
(Distn) Market
Structure
(no.)
Aida R. Librero 
Eesources Productivity in 
Hilkfish Culture in the 
Philippines (Oct. 1979)
1,175/nationside Fishpond Hilkfish 1 £ belou 
1 - 5
5.01 - 10
10.01 - 20 
20.01 - 50 
sore than 50
- 178
- 392
- 192
- 201
- 153
- 59
osned - 5 It 
leased - 46k 
combination - 3k
98k of produced is narketed. 
Market Outlet
Fishfaroers generally sell to 
srholesaiers, the rest sell
directly to retailers or on a 
consignment basis. Consignaent 
is generally practiced by large 
faros.
Price Received
Selling to retailers, 
ooananded the highest price - 
(P5.05/kilo}; consignment basis 
(POO) and nkolesaling {P4.86}
Oist'n. by Karket Destination
In the sane barrio - 118 operators
In the same Binicipaiity - 446
in the sase province - 446
in big cities (Hanila, Cebu
Iloilo) - ZOO “
Hethod of Delivery
picked up - 470 
delivered - 705
Type of Para Size
Author/Title Sasple Size/ Aquaculture (has.)
(date of publication) Location Industry Specie
Ounersbip Tenurial Arrangement
(Distn) Market
Structure
Elizabeth S. Nicolas 174/Laguna de fishpea Milkfish 1 A below - 26 BA 991 of produces is marketed.
and Aida R. Librero/ Bay (971) 1.01 - 5 - 69
A Sacio-econosic study (Rizal A Tilapia 5.01 - 10 - 34 Distribution by Outlet
of Pish Pen Aquaculture Laguna) (31) 10.01 A
in Laguna Lake, Phil. above - 9 wholesale - 132 operators (761)
(Oct. 19T9) (148 sauples 
only)
retail
consigneent - 42 operators (231)
contractual 
Price Received
Selling by contractual arrangesent 
result to higher price for the 
operator while those oho sell by 
retail obtained the louest price.
Market Outlet
Produce is generally sold in Manila.
3. Manuel L. Laapao I 
Estrella H. Latorre/
The Econoaics of 
Brackishvater fishfaning 
in Selected Provinces in 
the Phils. (June 1983)
200/Capiz, Negros 
Occidental, 
Csnarines Sur,
H. Sanar A 
Eaoboanga City
Brackishuater Milkfish 
fishponds prawn 
(polyeulture)
3.93 A belca - 83 privateLy-owned - (61%) 122
10 - 39.93 - 36 through purchase- (73?)
40 A above - 21 inheritance - (201)
donation - (21)
government-based - (231) 48 
privately leased - (151) 29
Author/Title 
{date of publication)
Sample Size/ 
location
Type of 
Aquaculture 
Industry Specie
faro Size 
(has.)
Ownership Tenurial Arrangement 
(Distn) Market
Structure
fenaida S. Deia Cruz A 35/Quezon fishpond Milkfish 10 A belov
(no.) 
- 28 osned - 27 Marketing Costs P0.23/kg.
Saara S. Lizarondo/ 
fishpond Operations A 
marketing Practices in 
Quezon Province 
(Sept. 1378)
praam
crabs
11 - 20 
21-30 
31-40 
41 A above
- 41
- 19
- 3
- 4
government-leased - 30 
privately leased - 4 
partly-ouned A 
partly-leased - 4 
sub-leased - 2 
(caretaker) - 26 
(administrator) - 2
Manner of Desposition
Mo.
1. Bidding 51 
a. Open 24
%
53.60
b. Widespread 27 
2. Contract w/
regular buyers 10 18.95
3. Ho response 26 27.37
Distribution by type of Delivery
Mo. %
Delivered 44 46.32
Picked 10 18.35
dipped 7 8.42
Both (Picked up/
Delivered) 0 7.36
Distribution by type of Outlet
Ho. X
Broker 51 53.00
Wholesaler 12 12.63
Wholesaler 4 4.21
Mailer 2 2.11
Terms of Payment
Ho. 1
Cash and carry 38 40
COD 13 20
Consipnent 13 13.68
Credit 7 7.37
Author/Title 
(date of publication)
Sample Sine/ 
Location
Type of 
Aquaculture 
industry Specie
Fan Sine 
(has.)
Ounership fenurial Arrangement 
(Bistn) Banket
Structure
5. Bsbos. *A Socio-eeononoiic 
Simp of tbe Aquaculture 
Ind. of Cagayan Valley' 
(1978)
139 Bespondents
Cagayan-91
Isabela-48
Fish farming Saugus
Tilapia
Carp
Catfish
Bangus fares 
Tilapia fans 
Carp fans 
Catfish farms 
Combination
- 19.27 ha.
- 2592 sq.m.
- .92 ha.
- 4287 sq.m.
- 3557 sq.m.
BA Fishes sold by direct retail. 
Sold uitbln the barrio and Is 
poblacion markets.
6. Aspuria, Pabro. A 
Soeio-eco. Surrey of tiie 
Aquaculture Ind. of Bicol" 
(1979)
102 Bespondents 
Camarines Sur-39 
Borte-21 
Basbate -42
Fish farming
111 Pure bangus Polyculture 
Pure pram/crab
- 10.97 ha
- 14.09 ha.
- 17.93 ha.
HA 4 types of selling arrangements'.
1. direct Wholesale
2. consignment
3. direct retail
4. by contract
788 sold to uholesalers
T. Bicolas, Parducho 'A 
Socio-econ. Study of the 
Aquaculture Industry in C. 
Tisayas* (1979)
132 respondents 
Bohol-56 
Cebu-76
Fish farming Bangus 7.39 ha. BA 951 of prod, sold to narket.
838 sold harvest to uholesalers; 
188 direct to consumers.
S. Ubrero, Lapie 'Crab Failing 
in the Phil.'- A Socio-econ. 
Study* (1979)
61 respondents Crab farting Crab Pure crab 
Crab/Pram 
Crab/Hilkfisb 
Crab/Bilkfish/ 
Pratm 
Crab A Others
- 8.8 ha.
- 13 ha.
- 13.2
- 18.53 ha.
- 7.01 ha.
Omed - 37 
Leased - 61 
Others - 2
Almost all products are sold in wholesale 
basis at an average price of PT.63/kg.
9. iiibrero, Fabro *A Socio- 
Economic Study of Hudflsh 
Culture (1979)
36 operators 
Cagayan Yalley-3 
Ilocos-4
Fish farming thidfish 1693 sq. e. BA 708 sold, 258 eaten, and 
58 given anay
Type of Far® Size
Author/Title Sample Size/ Aquaculture :h ;s ‘
idate of publication) Location Industry Specie
Ownership Tenurial Arrangement
(Distn) Harket
Structure
13. Librero, et. ai. 'Hiifcfish 
Farming in the Phil.'- A 
Socio-econ. Study
UK operators 
National
Fish farming Bangus IS ha. Owners/Lessess : 57S 
Caretaker : 33*
4 types of selling arrangements:
1. wholesale (SIS)
2. consignment (25S)
3. retail (14S)
4. by contract (31)
60% delivered Bangus to buyers. 
Charging of delivery cost prevalent.
Karket outlets:
1. if/in barrio (ICS)
2. s/in town (38%)
3. w/in prov. (371)
4. Outside pm. (17%}
Method of payment:
1. Cash (S4S)
2. Credit (2(IS)
3. Installment (2%)
U. Librero, et. al. "An Scon. 
Analysis of the Prod'n. of 
Prawn in Luzon" (1979)
104 operators 
Ilocos-5 
S. Luzon-7B 
Bicol-21
Prawn farming Prawn 10.26 ha. HA 99S were sold to the market.
4 types of selling arrangements:
1. wholesale
2. consignment
3. retail
4. by contract
Average price:
1. wholesale - P40.39
2. consignment - P51.13
3. retail - P53.44
4. by contract - P43.35
Author/Title 
(date of publication)
Saiple Size/ 
Location
Type of 
Aquaculture 
Industry Specie
fan Size 
(has.)
Ownership Tenurial Arrangetent
(Distn)
12. Tidon, Librero "A 131 respondents
Socio-Econ. Study of Tilapia Rational 
Farting in the Phil.' (1918)
Fish faming Tilapia Stall fan 
Sediut fan 
large fan
- 251 sq.t.
- 3021 sq.i.
- 2.22 has.
HA
Harfcet
Structure
81 respondents sold fish to tarket 
as near as 2 hi. in Cag. Talley 
and 3 kt. in Ilocos to as far as 
81 ks. in other regions.
Paytent was in cash.
76 of then sold on retail basis 
while 18* sold on wholesale basis. 
Of 81 farters, 628 delivered their 
prod, to buyers.
13. Pasnlaklakin, Dizon, Bans, 586 respondents Fish faming Bangus Bangus tans - 5.66 has HA Bangus: 4 selling patterns:
"A Socio-Kcon. Survey of the Tilapia I. Hooocult. - 5.82 has. 1. wholesale - P5.62/kg.
Aquacult. Ind. of S. Luzon* Carp 2. Polycult. - 5.42 has 2. consigntent - P5.50/kg.
(1979) Guraii 3. retail - P3.78/|g.
Dalag Freshwater - 5.64 has. 4. by contract - P5.QS
Bito 1. Tilapia
2. Cant
-1(1810 sq.i. 
- 940 sq.i. 638 of faners don't deliver fish
to buyers.
268 delivered a/ charge. 
198 delivered free.
14. Bans, Aspuria 'A
Socio-Bcon. Survey of the 
mikfisb Farters in 8. 
Tisayas* (1919)
18 Operators 
Southern Leyte-8 
Borthern Satar-10
Fishfaraing Bangus 43.33 has. 8A 998 sold
After harvest, crop is inediately 
disposed.
Retail: P4.98/kg.
Nholesale: P4.74/hg.
818 of oper. delivered crops to 
buyers, 208 bad buyers uho 
picked-up bangus on fan.
638 sold within prov'l. location, 
388 sold as far as 187 ha.
Price highest in Dec. and lowest 
in Aug.
Author/Title 
(date of publication)
Sample Siae/ 
Location
Type of 
Aquaculture 
Industry Snecie
Farm Siae 
(has.)
Ownership Tenurial Arrangement
(Distn) Harket
Structure
Lapie, Aspura "A Socio-Bcon. 
survey of the Aquaculture 
Ind. in Hindanao" (1979)
22(1 respondents Fish faming Bangus 24.67 has. HA 97% of total prod'n went to market. 
Majority sold products on 
wholesale: 18X sold directly to 
consumers.
fidon "A Socio-Scon. Survey 
of the Aquaculture Ind. of 
C. boon' (1379)
370 respondents Fishfarming Bangus
Tiiapia
Carp
Prawn
Hudfish
Bangus farms 
Tilapia farms 
Carp farms 
Mudfish farms 
Catfish farms
- 20.75 has.
- .60 has.
- 1,66 has.
- 1300 sq. a,
- 200 sq. |.
HA folk of crop marketed.
85% of oper. delivered fish to 
buyers.
Delivery was usually without charge. 
Market outlets were usually within 
towns or prov'I location.
Naaarenc. Hicolas, Librero 
’A Socio-Bcon. Survey of 
Aquaculture Ind. in H. 
Tisayas" (1979)
294 respondents Fish faming 13,95 has. HA 4 Types of Selling Arrangement:
1. wholesale
2. consignment
3. retail
4. contract
6* sold directly to wholesalers. 
Consignment conton ai&rag big farm 
oper, (231).
9X sold to retailers, i% sold by 
consigT®ent.
3TS sold «itkin town; 36% sold 
within prov; 28% sold to other 
provinces.
Distance of market outlets-173.4 km.
HA. - not available
Source: Delos Angeles H. et. al. Economics of Philippine Fisheries and Aquatic Resources: A Literature Summary. PIDs forking Paper Series Ho. 90-IT, My 1930.
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A study o f  Dannhaeuser (1986)1 observed that the tenancy arrangem ent in fishponds differs 
depending on farm size. In small sized farms averaging 1.9 hectares, tenancy arrangem ent varies from 
a very simple structure, wherein the owner operates and manages the farm him self and hires temporary 
wage labor w henever the need arises, to a three-tiered tenancy arrangement wherein the roles of 
ownership, capitalization and caretaking are performed by different individuals. About six percent of 
the aqua farms surveyed fall under the former arrangement while 37 percent are in the latter arrangement. 
The remaining 57 percent of the farms employ a two-tiered tenancy arrangement involving either an 
owner with a caretaker or an owner with a lessee.
Except for the simple tenancy structure, share-cropping is widely practiced in the other tenancy 
arrangement. The usual sharing scheme between a caretaker and an owner is one-third and two-thirds 
of the net profit respectively (i.e., after deducting operating costs). The form er provides labor while the 
latter provides the land and capital. In the case of a three-tiered arrangement the lessee pays a fixed 
prepaid rent to the owner, and the returns are shared equally by the lessee and caretaker after deducting 
all costs including lease. Leaseholders may at times operate the ponds without the help o f the caretaker, 
hence retain the total profit.
The tenancy arrangement in aquaculture as indicated above is similar to the tenancy arrangement 
practiced in traditional agriculture. The major difference though is that the tenancy relation in the former 
approximates a patron-client bond and not a personalized social inequality as in the latter. This arises 
because caretakers in aquaculture tend to be less subservient than rice tenants, aside from enjoying some 
monopoly over technical expertise and having greater opportunities to defraud owners.
In contrast to small-scale aquaculture, large-scale aquaculture employs a four-tiered tenancy 
arrangement consisting o f caretakers, a manager, a leaseholder and the owner. At the very least, when 
owners choose not to lease their farms, a three-level tenancy structure (i.e., owner, manager, and 
caretakers) is observed. The managerial position arises because of the need for a number of caretakers 
to man the different production units in the farm. Such practice is also common in medium-scale rice 
cultivation where the owner appoints an individual as the “ right-hand m an.”  The manager is basically 
the link between the owner and the caretaker who coordinates production and marketing activities as 
well as supervises personnel needs.
Dannhaeuser (1986) noted the share-tenancy arrangement in both small-sized and large aqua 
farms. This is perhaps because the owner is still dependent on the caretaker for the efficient functioning 
of his farm. Hence, by allowing the caretaker a share in the farms profits, the trust between the owners 
and caretakers is maintained. In contrast, under a fixed wage system, trust tends to be lost because the 
caretaker’s earning is not affected by the farm ’s profitability. The sharing scheme in large aqua farms, 
however, is minimal in contrast to the sharing scheme in small-sized farms. Caretakers’ remuneration 
in large farms generally consists of a share, a wage and credit. The share received is usually five percent 
o f the gross return (with only marketing costs deducted). The wage is a monthly living allowance, about 
80 percent o f which is in the form of a caretaker’s loan previously advanced to him and later on deducted 
from the five percent share after the fishes have been sold. Unlike the small-scale aqua farms where
1. Based on a survey o f brackishwater fishponds in Lingayen Gulf. The sample consists o f 74 small-scale operating units 
and eight large-scale aqua farms.
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caretakers frequently tap owners or lessees for credit, in large-size farms the credit system is embedded 
in the pay system. Managers, on the other hand, receive a wage and a share o f the caretakers’ 
commission.
Farm size. According to size, fishponds are generally classified into small (farms with less than 
10 hectares), medium (farms of 10-50 hectares in size) and large (farms of more than 50 hectares). Table 
6 shows that m ost fishponds in the country are medium-sized. Further, there are more farms classified 
beyond the 5-hectare retention limit of CARP. Fishponds have an average size of 7.9 hectares, the 
majority of which are bangus farms. The average farm size for prawn farms is 16 hectares, while 
m udfish/tilapia  farms are smaller (0.3 hectare) since these species are generally cultured in fishcages/ 
fishpens rather than in fishponds.
Marketing!distribution system. The marketing system for aquaculture products is basically 
similar to that of capture fisheries. Fresh fish are sold either in the local wet markets or in areas outside 
the farms. A sale is made by fishbrokers through open or secret bidding. Prices generally vary depending 
on the available supply each morning. However, fishfarmers who sell large quantities o f fish are able 
to bargain for higher prices.
Other studies done on fishfarmers in the country (Table 6) noted that: (a) the most frequent 
buyers of fishfarm ers’ produce were the brokers, wholesalers and cooperatives. Only a minimal amount 
was sold directly to retailers, wholesalers-retailers and consumers; and (b) on the average, most of the 
produce (98 %) is marketed.
The dominance of wholesalers as the major distribution outlet specifically for the small-scale 
fishfarmers may have a bearing on their credit activities. As in traditional agriculture, the fisheries sector 
is also faced with the difficulty of obtaining financing from institutional sources, and therefore relies 
mainly on noninstitutional sources for its financing requirements. Because informal lending is based on 
personalistic relationships, it is often the case that interlinked activities come about as a means o f dealing 
with the asymmetry of information and of improving credit enforcement.
Interlinked relationships are fairly common in the fisheries sector. The usual practice is for 
traders to provide for operational expenses and for loans to be paid in terms of the produce valued at 
prefixed rates (Ruckes 1989; Teitze 1987). The provision o f credit also serves as the lender’s means of 
establishing a relationship with the fish producer who not only provides them with a constant supply of 
fish but also serves as a source of future investment. This practice is primarily observable in artisanal 
fisheries. The lack of literature on the extent of informal lenders’ influence over/relationship with the 
small-scale fishfarmers, however, prevents one to infer about the credit-output link in aquaculture. 
However, given the common characteristics of smallscale fishermen and their objective conditions (e.g., 
level of technology used, absence of collateral, etc.), it may be hypothesized that a similar practice occurs 
in the sector.
3. Cost and Return Analysis
Investm ent and intensification. Aquaculture is a highly capital-intensive undertaking as indi­
cated by its high capital investment requirements and cost of operations (T able 7). Even its use of simple
INVESTMENT AND OTHER INPUTS, AQUACULTURE INDUSTRY IN THE 
PHILIPPINES,VARIOUS SURVEYS
Table 7
Labor Credit
Reference Fare She Capital Investaents Operating Bequiretent Source &
Author/Title Period (ha ) (per hectare) Capital (aandays/hectare) Financing
(per hectare)
L. Aida R. Librero/Resources 
Productivity in Kilkfish 
Cultnre in the Philippines
2. Hanuel Laopao and Estrella H. 
Latorre/The Econoaics of 
Brackishuater Fishfaralng on 
Selected Province in the 
Philippines
3. Eenaida S. dela Cm and 
Haora S. Liaarondo/Fishpond 
Operators and Harketing 
Practices in Quezon Province
1977-1978 ive.-13.39
C? 13B1 Stall = 4.80 
Hediua -- 16.04 
Large = T4.S6 
ive. - 15.66
C! 1977 ive. -- 16.14
E.i.
P26,562/ha
P12,992.74/ha
PI,458/ha
S■= P5,501/ha 
H = P2tlTl/ha 
L = PI,858/ha
P4.352.91/ha.
H.i .
S = 45 
H 24
L = 10
616
H. i .
H. i .
Banks (20.OX) 
Private aoney 
lenders (1.05X) 
Friends/relatives 
(70.37X)
4. iida It. Librero and 
Hicostrato Perea/Differential 
Productivity and Incone 
Generation of Fish Culture 
Technology in the Phil.
5. Elisabeth S. Nicolas and iida 
R. Librero/i Socio Econoaic 
Study of Fishpen Aquaculture 
in Laguna Lake, Philippines
1978-1979 ive. = 9.79
1974-1975 ive. = 6.09
P703/ha a/
P7,700/ha
Honoculture 
P2,439/ha 
Polyculture 
P3,907/ha
P12,000/ha
Kono = 32 
Palay = 60
150
H. i .
Self-financed 
(89X);
Borroned 
capital (S.3X) 
BBs (37.5X) 
Inforaal (62.5X) 
Both (l.TX)
Author/Title
Reference
Period
Pars Size 
(ha !
Capital Investnents 
(per hectare)
Operating 
Capital 
(per hectare)
Labor 
Requireient 
{iandsy/ha )
Credit 
Source & 
financing
8. Anaryllis Torres and R.P. 
Tentura/Econonics and Social 
I upsets of the Aquaculture 
Production Project
1372 Ave. = 15 ha 8. A.
S = 2,481 
8 = 1,567 
L = 1,418
S = 168 
8 = 65 
L = 53
8.A.
7. Banos, A Socio-econonic 
Survey of the Aquaculture 
Ind. of Cagayan Valley
1377 Bangus-10.27 ha 
Tilapia-2532ns 
Carp-32((flii 
Catfish-428711
Bangus-P318 a/ 
!ilapia-P214 
Ofirp -P280 
Catfish -P316
Bangus-872 Bangus-13.6 
Tilapia-37 
Carp-24 
Catfish-16.1
HA
8. Aspuria, fabro. A Socio-eco. 
Survey of the Aquaculture Ind. 
of Bicol.
1378 Eangus -11.0 
Pmn/crab-17.33
fan  land-Pl,318 
construction A 
dist - P3,409 
bldg. materials 
and transpo-170
Bangus-P6Q3 
Prawns/crab-P862 
Polyculture -PI,132
Bangus -17.8 
Prawn/crab 30.96 
Polyculture 45.31
Informal ubere 
payaent last 
for one day to 1 
ueek u/o interest
S. Bicolas, Parducho. A Socio- 
econ. Study of the Aquaculture 
Industry in Central Luzon
1378 Bangus -7.83 ha °1,211 a/ P658 30:5 HA
10. Librero, Lapie. Crab Parsing 
on the Phils: A Socio-Scon 
Study
1378 crab 8.8 
crab/prasn 13 
craf/iilkfish 13.32 
Polyculture 16.53
P2.893 Pi,338 31.6 HA
Labor Credit
deference fan  Size Capital Investeents Operating Requireient Source 6
Author/Title Period (ha } (per hectare) Capital (tandays per ha ) financing
(per hectare)
11. Librero, fabro. A Socio-econ. 
Study of Hudfish Culture
1978 Sudfish-1633B9 306/fan 120/fan 29.5/faTB HA
12. Librero, et. al. An Sconoaic 
Analysis of the Production 
of Praun in Luzon
1978 Praun faming-10.26 Acquisition-P6372 
Dev't-Cost-P5599 
Rent - P824 
0thers-P458
PI,337 HA HA
13. Tidon, Librero. A Socio-Scon. 
Study of Tilapia faraing 
in the Phil.
14. Paaulaklakin, 0. A Socio-Scon. 
Surrey of the Aquaculture,
Ind. of S. Luzon
1977 Tilapia 
saall-25ina 
aediun-3027aa 
large 2.22 ha
Bangus
8onoculture-5.82 ha 
Polyculture-5.42 ‘
Tilapia- P4.678
Honoculture-P261
Polyculture-P346
P884
Honoculture-Pl,033
Polyculture-Pl,402
32/fara
Honoculture-15
Polyculture-81.7
HA
HA
15. Lapie, Aspuria. A Socio-econ 
Surrey of the Aquaculture 
Ind. in Hindanao
1976 Bangus-24.67 ha P4,524 (excldg. land) P15,901/fara 18.6 HA
a/ Excludes fara land, construction and derelopaent cost.
HA - not available
Source: Delos Angeles H. et. al. icononics of Philippine Fisheries and Aquatic Resources: A Literature Suaaary. PIDS Dorking Paper Series Ho. 90-17, July 1990.
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fishpens or fishcages involves a substantial amount of money compared to the financial requirements 
of small scale rice and corn production. Furthermore, the cost also varies depending on the level of 
intensification, that is, the extent to which improved technology in pond design, fertilization, feeding, 
stock manipulation and pest control is employed. Intensification can be classified into (a) traditional, (b) 
extensive, and (c) intensive. Traditional fishfarming makes use of traditional techniques such as 
dependence on the natural productivity of water, little control over stocks and the use of simple 
equipment. The extensive system similarly uses simple equipment but utilizes some amount of 
supplemental feeding and pest control. Intensive fishfarming, on the other hand, utilizes a sufficient 
amount of fertilizers, pesticides, feeds and stocks. It also involves large investments for engineering and 
infrastructure, improvements. A comparison of the typical costs and levels of intensification for the 
culture of panaeid shrimps in Southeast Asia is shown below (Rabanal 1987).
Type
Development 
equipment 
cost(P /ha )
Annual opera­
ting cost 
(P/ha crop)
No. of 
croppings 
per year
Production
(kg./ha/yr.)
Traditional 20,000-50,000 5,000-10,000 variable 100-400
Extensive 50,000-100,000 10,000-50,000 2 500- 2,000
Semi-
intensive 200,000-500,000 100,000-200,000 2.5 2,000-6,000
Intensive 500,000-1,000,000 200,000-500,000 2.5 7,000-20,000
Although survey results reveal that most fishfarms in the country use intensive culture (i.e., 
supplemental feeds/pesticides are applied), the practice is generally more of the extensive type because 
of the observed minimum usage level of fertilizer, feeds and pesticides (Laopao and Latorre 1983).
Source o f  Financing. Only a few studies have looked into the aspect of credit sourcing and 
financing for aquaculture. Studies conducted on fishpond communities (Librero 1976) and fishfarmers 
(Azurin 1976) noted the importance of financing to aquaculture. These studies observed that: (a) 
fishfarmers generally utilize their own funds to finance about 60 percent of their operating costs, with 
the remaining 40 percent borrowed from external sources; (b) about 55 to 60 percent of fishfarmers avail 
themselves o f credit assistance from formal institutions for supplemental funds; and (c) an estimated 30 
to 40 percent of fishfarmers go to relatives and friends for financial assistance. The informal lenders, 
primarily friends and relatives, were found to have been the major source o f financing for the sector. 
Bank credit, on the other hand, was sourced mainly from the rural banks which are basically conduits 
of government special credit programs for the fisheries sector.
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4. Productivity, Farm Income, Ownership and Farm Size
In general, production per farm is directly related to farm  size. Therefore, regions with larger 
farm areas have comparatively higher production. Productivity, however, is not related to farm size. A 
study on milkfish productivity by region (Librero 1977) noted that Ilocos farm s with an average rearing 
area of 3.3 hectares yielded 709 kilos per hectare, com pared to farms in Northern M indanao with an 
average rearing area o f 35.5 hectares which yielded only 399 kilos per hectare (Table 8). The highest 
net return was noted for farms from five to 10 hectares. However, a similar study done by Torres and 
Ventura (1983) observed the following: (a) gross income and net income progressively increase as farm 
areas increase from less than 20 hectares to 40 hectares and more; (b) expenses incurred decrease per 
hectare and per kilo of fish, as total farm size increases; and (c) small farms incurred a deficit after 
deducting all expenditures. These findings seem to imply that larger fishfarms are more economical to 
operate than small ones. Furthermore, fishfarms which are 10 hectares or bigger realize better net 
earnings.
The only study which analyzed the factors affecting the productivity of fishponds using an 
econometric model was that by Laopao and Latorre (1983). Using three different forms o f productivity, 
that is, yield per hectare, production per farm, and gross income per farm, the factors found to be 
significant and with a positive effect on production in all three models were; (a) capital investment, (b) 
fertilizers, (c) pesticides, (d) fry/fingerling, and (e) labor. Farm size was found to be a positive and 
significant factor only for the first two models. The effect of tenure and technology factors on production 
was also determined using dummy variables. The results showed that; (a) privately-owned farms are 
more productive than leased farms, (b) intensive culture is more productive than extensive culture, and 
(c) monoculture farms are more productive than polyculture farms.
ffl. STRUCTURE OF CREDIT MARKETS IN THE FISHERIES SECTOR
AND THE CARP
Studies on rural credit markets in the country and other developing countries abound (Adams and 
Vogel 1986; Lamberte and Lim 1987; Braverman 1990; Flora and Yotopoulos 1991). These studies 
revealed the existence o f an “ urban bias”  in the allocation of credit where formal financial institutions 
prefer to lend to big, nonagricultural clients. Such bias arises largely from accountability and informa­
tional problem s and the inability of formal rural credit markets and the government to institute policies 
or programs that will minimize these problems.
In general, lending to agriculture is riskier than commercial lending because o f the characteris­
tics inherent in agriculture such as: (a) the seasonal nature of agricultural production; (b) the 
geographically-dispersed location of farmers; (c) the high susceptibility of the sector to natural 
calamities; (d) the large covariance of risk, i.e., adversities often affecting a large number of loan 
recipients simultaneously; and (e) the basically subsistence nature o f agriculture, making it difficult for 
the sector to meet the requirements imposed by formal financial institutions. Coupled with this is the 
absence or undeveloped state o f insurance markets that could cater to these risks.
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COST AND RETURN ANALYSIS, AQUACULTURE INDUSTRY IN THE PHILIPPINES
(Various Surveys)
Table 8
Author/Title Average Production Gross income Net income
(date of publication) Reference farm size(kg/ha/yr. (per hectare (per hectare)
period (ha) per cropping) per cropping) per cropping)
1. Aida R. Librero. Resources 1977-1978 13,4 580 P2,294 P368
Productivity in Milkfish
Culture in the Phil.
2. Elizabeth S. Nicolas and 1974-1975 6.1 3,798 P15.580 P3,489
Aida R. Liberero. A
Socio-Economic Study of 
Fishpen Aquaculture in 
Laguna Lake, Phil.
3. Manuel L. Laopao and 
Estrella M. Latorre. The 
Economics of Brackishwater 
Fishfarming in Selected 
Provinces in the Phil.
1981 15.7 S = 6 0 2  
M = 882 
L = 1,034
S = 8,443 
M = 4,7(69 
L = 6,775
S = 2,942 
M = 2,598 
L = 4,917
Zenaida s. Dela Cruz and 
M aura S. Lizarando. 
Fishpond Operations and 
CY 1977 Marketing 
Practice in Quezon 
Province
CY 1977 16.1 969 P4,589.79 Bangus= PI,228.28 
Sugpo= 13,739.81
Aida R. Librero and 
Nicostrato Perez. 
Diffferential Productivity 
and Income Generation of 
Fish Culture Technology in 
the Phil.
CY 1978-79 9.8 Mono =1,034 Mono = P5,705 Mono= P3,266
Poly = 700 Poly = P8.439 Poly = P4.532
Amaryllis Torres and R.F. 
Ventura. Economics and 
Social Impacts of the 
Aquaculture Production 
Project
1972 15.0 S = 1,343/farm S= 10,967 5 = 2
M = 3.579/farm M = 32.901 M = 300
L = 14.092/farm L = 135,789 L = 505
All = 51,108 All = 412
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Table 8 (continued)
Author/Title Average Production Gross income Net income
(date of publication) Reference farm size (kg/ha/yr. (per hectare (per hectare
period (ha) per cropping) per cropping) percropping)
7. Ramos. A Socio-Economic 
Survey of the Aquaculture 
Ind. of Cagayan Valley
Aspuria, Fabro. A Socio- 
Economic Survey of the 
Aquaculture Ind. of Bicol
1977 Bangus-10.3 Bangus-330 Bangus-Pl,816 Bangus-P944
Tilapia-2592mm Tilapia-94/farm Tilapia-P 1,690 Tilapia-P678
Carp-200mm Carp-103/kg/farm Carp-P5,702 Carp-Pl,012
Calfish-4287mm Catfish-28 kg/farmCatfish-P40 Catfish-P58
Monoculture
1978 Bangus- 11.0 Bangus 300 Bangus P1288 BangusP679
Prawn/Crab-17.93 Prawn 55 Prawn P 981 Prawn P 166
Crab 476 Crab P3.111 Crab P2,249
Polvculture
Bangus 280 
Prawn 48 
Crab 123
Nicolas, Parducho. A Socio- 1978 
Economic Study of the Aqua­
culture Ind. in C.Visayas
Bangus-7.89 Bangus-289 Bangus-P1.025 Bangus-P367
10. Librero, Lapie. Crab Farming 1978 Crab-88 Mono-339 P3.882 P2.484
in the Phils: A Socio-Econ. Crab/Prawn-13 Poly-698
Study Crab/milkfish 13.3
Polyculture 18.53
11. Librero, Fabro. A Socio-Econ. 1978 Mudfish-1.697 mm 206 P335 P215
Study of Mudfish Culture
12. Librero et al. An Economic 1978 Prawn-1026 Prawn- 243 Prawn-P2,782 Prawn-PI.445 
Analysis of the Production
of Prawn in Luzon
13. Tidon, Librero. A Socio-Econ. 1977 Tilapia Monoculture-418Tilapia-1,768 Tilapia-804
Study of Tilapia Farming in Small-251 mm Polyculiure Tilapia- Tilapia-Carp-188
the Philippines Medium-3027 mm Tilapia-Carp-776 Carp -3,160 Tilapia others -
535
Large - 2.22/ha Tilapia-bangus- Tilapia
others - 334 Others-2,056
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Table 8 (continued)
Aulhor/Tillc Average Production Gross income Net income
(date of publication) Reference farm size (kg/ha/yr. (per hectare (per hectare
period (ha ) per cropping) per cropping) pcrcropping)
Bangus Bangus
14. Pamulaklakin, D. A Socio- 1979 Monoculture - 53 Monoculture * 471 Mono - 1,684 Mono-651 
Econ. Survey of the Aqua- Polyculture - 5.42 Polyculture - 969 Poly - 2,778 Poly -1,386
culture Industry of Southern 
Luzon
15. Lapie, Aspuria. A Socio- 1978 Bangus - 24.67 361 30,675 14,774
Econ. Survey of the Aqua­
culture Industry in Mindanao
NA - not available.
Source: Delos Angele^M . et al 'Econom ics of Philippine Fisheries and Aquatic Resources: A Literature 
Summary.*PIDS Working Paper Series No. 90-17, July 1990.
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In addition, the rural credit market is also faced with informational problems which lead to 
adverse selection, moral hazards and high transaction costs. Policy distortions also make it difficult for 
formal lending institutions to be efficient lenders. These make it almost impossible to determine the risk 
characteristics o f borrowers and hinder the credit market from  clearing at the optimal price. Floro and 
Yotopoulos (1991) stressed that these imperfections lead to various arrangements such as credit 
rationing, credit layering and interlinkages that serve as substitutes for the missing network o f complex 
legal and market institutional infrastructures generally present in developed countries which make 
lending feasible in these countries.
Credit rationing implies that loan contracts are limited to a relatively “ homogeneous a&t of 
borrowers.”  For the formal sector, such borrowers are characterized by well-defined property rights, 
enforceable formal contracts and credit guarantees. Hence, since agriculture borrowers do not, in 
general, meet these criteria, they are rationed out o f the market and are accommodated by the informal 
lenders. For the informal sector, the information problems are less severe because o f their ‘ ‘personalistic 
relationships”  with borrowers, enabling them to have a more extensive and accurate evaluation of 
borrowers’ risk. Further, informal lenders are able to put mechanisms to work (e.g., interlinked credit) 
that allow them to minimize credit risk brought about by the inherent characteristics o f agriculture.
The extensive discussions and analysis o f the structure and nature of the rural credit market, 
however, have been drawn primarily from the nuances o f peasant agriculture. Little has been written 
about the fisheries credit markets. A nd while the problems of credit rationing, asymm etric information 
and market segmentation in peasant agriculture may likewise be observed in the fisheries sector, the 
extent and characteristics of such problems may significantly differ in the latter. Informal credit 
transactions and behavior in the fisheries credit markets may also be different. It is hypothesized that the 
credit problems faced by the fisheries sector are more serious considering the greater uncertainties and 
risks involved. In addition to the agricultural problems stated earlier, fisheries are also faced with (a) 
undefined property rights and common property problems; (b) a limited knowledge of fishing potentials 
and technologies; (c) high susceptibility to environmental hazards (e.g., pollution); (d) highly variable 
prices; (e) high storage cost; and (f) generally backward social and economic conditions o f the fishing 
community.
In this regard a conceptual framework for examining the fisheries credit m arket in the context 
of the economics o f aquaculture and risk management is suggested here.
A. Economics o f  Aauaculture
M any forces-biological, physical and environm ental-affect aquaculture. The interplay o f these 
forces with economic factors results in various production possibilities and, hence, different levels of 
profitability. A schematic diagram in Figure 1 is presented to show these complexities. This model 
is based prim arily on pond culture, which is the most prevalent aquaculture system being used. Three 
major factors noted to be the primary means to increase productivity are: stocking rate, survival rate and 
growth rate (Shang 1981).
Stocking rate, which is the quantity o f fish in the pond, is influenced by space and natural food. 
The maximum standing crop (i.e., the maximum weight a  fish stock can sustain) is variable but can be
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Figure 1
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increased by fertilization and supplemental feeding, polyculture, stock manipulation, and aeration 
(Hickling 1962).
Increases in survival and growth rates, on the other hand, depend mainly on genetic improve­
ments and pond management manifested in correct stocking rate, the right kind arid amount of feed/ 
fertilizer, proper water quality and pest prevention.
Reducing the costs of purchasing and marketing is also necessary to increase profitability. This 
requires a “ least cost com bination”  strategy, specifically on pond construction and the use o f inputs.
Another important factor to consider for profitability is the price received for the product. In 
general, prices are determined by supply and demand conditions, with the fishfarmer, specifically the 
small operator, as the "price taker." However, it would be to the advantage o f the fishfarmers to have 
an im proved bargaining power, and this can be done through:
(1) an improvement in the quality of fish through proper packaging during transport and 
storage;
(2) a scheduling of harvests in consideration o f seasonality, that is, selling the product when 
supply is expected to be low; and
(3) cooperative marketing and product differentiation. Cooperative marketing, in general, 
improves the bargaining position o f fishfarmers. Likewise, increasing the value added 
of fish (e.g. frozen, salted, and smoked fish) may also improve revenue.
The above considerations in the fishery sector are in turn affected by socioeconomic factors and 
instituted structural changes that impinge specifically on the sector’s profitability. Adversities emanat­
ing from these factors-biological, physical and socioeconom ic-thus present a risk in aquaculture 
investm ent
B. R isk Element in Aquaculture
The risk elem ent o f a sector is a crucial factor in its ability to attract financing. In the case of 
aquaculture, banks are reluctant to lend to it because of the perceived risks. The risks commonly 
experienced in aquaculture operations are discussed in greater detail by W ebber (1973) who classified 
them into three types-biological, physical, and social and economic risks.
Biological risk is manifested in terms of the susceptibility o f fish to disease-inducing organisms 
that may cover the whole fish population. Fishes are also in constant risk o f aquatic predators and 
competitors. A nother biological constraint is the uncertainty of the productive ability of some species 
which makes it difficult to ascertain productive capacities. This risk is further aggravated by the 
limitation o f having to measure the number o f animals in the production system at any one time, and by 
the lack o f knowledge on the nutrition o f the species. The former factor is necessary because it has a 
bearing on the proper management of water quality, feeding rate and disease.
In contrast to biological risk which directly acts on the organism , physical risks act on the 
ecological system. Such risks include environmental activities—e.g., pollution, extended periods of
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cloudy days, and excessive fertilization, which all affect water quality and the maintenance of oxygen 
levels. Risks caused by natural perils, storm, floods, etc., can likewise have devastating effects on the 
sector, resulting in great financial losses. Laxity in the enforcem ent of laws particularly on resource 
conservation aggravates physical risks. For instance, the inability of the government to enforce selective 
logging and reforestation, as well as other forestry conservation methods, has resulted in the erosion of 
logged areas, causing the heavy siltation of coastal areas where brackishwater ponds are located, thus 
affecting fishpond productivity. Advances in pesticide control through the use o f chemicals (e.g., DDT, 
tea seed) and the direct disposal of raw sewage in rivers or seas increase bacterial counts that are 
generally disease-inducing organisms and create pesticide pollution (Juliano and Baylon 1990).
Social and economic factors are also important considerations in aquaculture undertakings. 
Political instability, weak enforcem ent of property rights, labor unrest and regulations that tend to be 
biased against the industry are critical elements for the profitability o f the venture. Unlike the biological 
and physical risks which affect only the production aspect, these risks affect all activity levels from 
production to processing and marketing.
A favorable economic climate is necessary for aquaculture. Immense inflation pressures result 
in increased costs and reduced earnings. Similarly, property rights need to be enforced, because thievery 
is common, and the securing of fishponds represents a substantial part o f the costs of operation. Nicolas 
and Librero (1979) reported that 69 percent of the total labor requirement involves safeguarding the 
pond.
A major structural reform instituted is the land reform program. W hile the previous land reform 
law (PD No. 27) covered only the rice and com areas, some repercussions in the aquaculture sector were 
noted, in particular, the conversion of rice and corn land to aqua farms (Dannhaeuser 1986). In turn, a 
number of aqua farms subdivided their holdings among trusted individuals into sm aller parcels in 
anticipation o f a land reform for the aquaculture industry. M anagement and operations, however, 
remained under the control of the original owner.
PD No. 27 impacts directly on the fisheries sector via the tenancy security proviso of the said 
decree, which covers sectors such as aquaculture that involve a “ tenant-tiller”  relationship. The law 
which defined the relationship between the owner (or lessee) and caretakers had two salutary effects. 
First, it allayed the caretaker’s fear of the possibility of being removed from tenancy, and second, the 
reform fostered a contradiction between tenancy security against the need for trust between those who 
manage and those who operate, and the process of land transactions. Such a contradiction occurs because 
the tenancy security enjoyed by the caretakers as a result of the reform does not diminish the monopoly 
pow er of the owner (or lessee). The caretakers are still dependent on the owner for capital while the 
owner, in turn, depends on the caretakers’ technical expertise and honesty. Hence, in aquaculture, 
agrarian reform did not bring about a change in the tenancy arrangement (i.e., share-cropping still 
dominated) because the owner continued to have a stake in the farm ’s output. This is in contrast to rice/ 
corn farming where agrarian reform brought about a change in the tenancy arrangem ent from a share- 
cropping system to a lease system or fixed payment mode.
Dannhaeuser pointed out the need for organizational changes to accompany the land reform 
program. Such changes should be distinct for the aquaculture sector, taking into account the peculiarities
of fishpond culture. O ne important consideration of a land reform program is the strengthening of the 
bargaining power of caretakers, implying the creation of a land reform package that will make them less 
dependent on owners, for instance, in terms of financial or credit requirements.
M arket changes associated with price fluctuations are also critical for fishfarm operators. 
Although aquafoods are high-valued products, their dependence on export markets creates risks caused 
by changes in trade policies and by highly variable world demand. The lack o f marketing infrastructure 
(e.g., cold storage) may lead to monopoly in the provision of inputs for fish farmers as exemplified in 
the limited supply of fry (Guerrero 1991), as well as to monopsony in output markets (Panatoyou 1987).
The risks caused by social and economic factors cannot be understated. The current problems 
that beset the aquaculture industry are caused by inadequate government policies on the import/export 
of needed commodities, the nondiversification of markets for export commodities, and inadequate 
policies on investment (Juliano and Baylon 1990).
C. Credit Constraints in Aquaculture
As indicated earlier, financing is essential for aquaculture development. The flow of financial 
resources to the sector is, however, limited not only because financial capital is scarce but also because 
of the implications on aquaculture of biological, physical, social and economic risks that expose the 
sector to various dangers which are, in general, noninsurable. The insecurity of ownership in aquacul­
ture, on the other hand, discourages investments because the benefits realizable from the sector which 
could be earned over the years become uncertain in the event that the government decides to call off lease 
agreements (Panatoyou 1987). Examples of insecurity of ownership hindering aquaculture development 
in Southeast Asia have been reported. In northeast Thailand, farmers with no ownership titles were 
reluctant to invest their limited savings in either land improvements or pond construction for fear that 
they would not be allowed to reap the full benefits of their investments (Kloke and Potaros 1975). A 
similar situation was reported in Malaysia where lack of ownership discouraged pond investments and 
high stocking rates for a more profitable intensive culture (Bakar and Rahad 1980). M ultiple ownership, 
as in the case of cooperative ownership, has analogous effects as mentioned above. Very often under the 
cooperative system no single owner has the incentive to invest. Another disadvantage for aquaculture 
is that it is a relatively new industry, and there are only a limited number of viable successful operators 
from whom banks can draw yardsticks to evaluate project proposals (FAO 1973).
As in agriculture, large fishfarmers have been the main beneficiaries o f the government’s special 
credit programs (Gerhardsen 1976). The majority of the small fishfarmers have limited or no access to 
credit. The available credit supply favors short-term credit which does not match the credit requirement 
of aquaculture.
W hile an established, large-scale aquaculturist may not find it difficult to get loans, the small- 
scale operator is unable to meet the conditions of formal financial institutions. First, he lacks an 
acceptable collateral. The land on which his pond is located cannot usually serve as collateral because, 
in most cases, lands, particularly those of small fishfarmers, are under lease contract either with the 
government or private owners and are hence generally of little value as collateral (Hamlisch 1976). For 
instance, in the Philippines, the Fishpond Lease Agreement (FLA) that defines holder-ownership or
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rights over the land is not considered by banks as strong collateral for loans, especially the FLAs 
covering undeveloped areas (Dingcong and Llanto 1991). The conditions that constrain FLA ’s 
acceptability as a collateral are: (a) ownership o f land is retained by the government, and, in cases of 
default, the leasehold rights assigned to the banks become nonperforming assets until such time that a 
new FLA holder takes over the area; (b) in the event that the FLA is canceled, improvements in the area 
are forfeited in favor of the government, making it difficult for banks to recover their loans; and (c) 
Presidential Decree No. 1585 issued in June of 1978, which provides for the right o f the govem m entin 
pursuit of national interest to revoke, alter, rescind or modify the lease agreement, prejudices the rights 
of banks that have granted loans on the basis of FLAs. The CARP, which puts retention limits on FLAs 
of only five hectares, is expected to further lessen the acceptability of FLAs as collateral due to some 
perception about a decrease in the value o f land and its possible negative impact on the profitability of 
aquaculture investments. In a recent discussion on FLAs as negotiable instruments for credit (ACPC 
1991), it was reported that banks were willing to accept FLAs as collateral if, upon default o f the 
borrower, they were to be given more authority to effect the transfer of the leasehold rights to another 
party.
A second reason why the small-scale fishfarmer has difficulty in obtaining loans from formal 
institutions is that there usually are no banks in the vicinity to serve the small-scale operator. Third, he 
lacks acredit history or business record which banks can use in order to obtain knowledge o f his character 
and creditworthiness. Fourth, he may be ignorant of credit facilities available for his needs, and fifth, 
credit costs may have been prohibitive for him. Aside from interest cost, bureaucratic hassles create an 
additional burden for the fishfarmer (FAO 1972). While the informal sector presents an alternative 
source o f financing, for the small-scale fishfarmers, the high initial capital required may render 
investment in the sector unprofitable if financed  through the informal sector, where interest rates are 
much higher as compared to the institutional rate of interest (Panatoyou 1989),
IV. C R E D IT  PO L IC Y  AND IN TER V EN TIO N S IN T H E
F ISH E R IE S  SE C T O R : T H E  P H IL IPP IN E  E X PE R IE N C E
A. Loans to the Fisheries Sector
The fisheries credit market is also characterized by the co-existence of both the informal and 
formal sources of credit. The informal sources are mainly private moneylenders and relatives and 
friends, and there is no accurate estimate of their size. Nor are there surveys on the fisheries sector, 
particularly on aquaculture, which may be used to gauge the extent of influence of informal lenders. A 
few studies, however, reported that the fishfarmers’ dependence on informal sources is about 70 percent 
(de la Cruz and Lizarando 1978; Nicolas and Librero 1977).
Loans from the formal sources, on the other hand, come from commercial banks, rural banks, 
thrift banks and specialized government banks. Of the total fisheries loans provided by these banks, the 
bulk was given to commercial fisheries and to large aquaculture operators. Credit for small-scale marine 
and aquaculture fisheries was practically nonexistent under the banks’ regular loan activities. If  these 
sectors were ever provided with financing, it was because of government intervention through special 
loan programs/schemes.
33
For the 11-year period covering 1980 to 1990, a total of P29.56 billion was channelled to the 
fisheries sector representing only about 9.21 percent o f the total institutional loans granted to agriculture 
(Table 9). Except for the forestry sector, the fisheries sector had the lowest share among the major 
agricultural commodities. Granted loans classified according to the type of bank revealed that private 
qommercial banks (PKBs) gave the bulk of the loans to the fisheries sector for the period 1986-90 (Table
10). Among government banks, the most active is the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). The recent 
trend is in contrast to the previous years (i.e., 1965 to 1977) when government banks particularly DBP 
and PNB were the major sources or conduits of fisheries loans (TBAC 1978).
B. Past Credit Policies and Programs fo r  Aquaculture
Because the private banking system shunned the financing of aquaculture, particularly the small- 
scale sector, the government was expected to take the initiative in financing pioneer ventures, 
infrastructure facilities and small-scale operations for the industry. The government thus intervened 
through credit policies and schemes aimed at directly subsidizing bank credit sourced from budgetary 
appropriations and foreign loans to meet the fishery sector’s financing requirements.
Credit Policies. Foremost among the credit policies that affected the fisheries sector were:
(a) Presidential Decree No. 704 (issued in 1975) which declared fisheries as a preferred area 
o f investment. Ameng other things, this law created the Fisheries Loan and Guarantee 
Fund (FLGF) which watf administered by the Central Bank through government-owned 
or controlled banking and financial institutions. The fund was made available to fi­
nance the development, rehabilitation and maintenance of fishponds, fishpens, as well as 
the acquisition of fishing boats and fish processing and marketing facilities. The FLGF 
also provided a guarantee cover of up to 85 percent of the loan.
(b) PD No. 717(issued in 1975) or the Agri-Agra Loan Quota which m andated financial 
institutions to allot 25 percent of their loanable funds to agriculture, fisheries and 
agrarian reform beneficiaries.
(c) Several Central Bank (CB) Circulars and Letters of Instructions (LOIs) that provided for 
incentives for the bank and the farm er or fishfarmer. These circularsand LOIs, provided 
for the following:
1) Relaxation of collateral requirements for rural banks and PNB borrowers which 
are participating in the government food production program;
2) Acceptance of any duly registered transfer certificate issued to tenant farmers in 
an amount not less than 60 percent of the value of the farm holding;
3) Conversion o f all agricultural guarantee funds into a single trust fund to be
administered by the Land Bank;
4) Establishment of the Barrio Guarantee Fund and Barrio Savings Fund for the 
guarantee o f all cooperative loans; and
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION LOANS GRANTED, BY COMMODITY: 1980-1990
(In million pesos at current prices)
Table 9
1880 1381 1982 1383 1984 1905 1986 198'7
Amount 1 Share Anount t  Share Aoount % Share Anount % Share Aaoant % Share Aoount 1 Share Amount % Share Asount X Share
CROPS 15,508.5 74.04 17,823.7 70.26 17,211.4 67.10 18,383.8 67.61 18,932.5 68.67 18,124.7 76.86 18,796.9 74.13 21,270.4 77.09
Rice 1,556.6 7.43 1,641.7 6.47 1.622.3 6.33 1,884.3 6.71 1,085.9 3.94 1,223.5 5.19 1,393.1 5.49 2,128.5 7.71
Com 147.1 0.70 202.3 0.80 250.8 0.98 207.3 0.74 177.5 0.64 182.1 0.77 226.7 0.89 546.3 1.98
Coconut 1,045.6 3.23 2,900.8 11.43 2.153.3 8.40 2.134.3 7.60 1,573.2 5.71 5,107.6 21.66 3,807.2 11.86 3.055.6 11.07
Sugarcane 7,602.4 36.23 6,521.3 25.70 8,327.6 34.81 8,200.3 29.20 6,068.8 22.01 5,048.5 21.41 4,142.8 16.34 5,512.9 19.98
Other Crops 4,256.8 20.32 6,563.0 25.86 4,256.8 16.60 6,563.0 23.37 10,027.1 36.37 6,563.0 27.83 10,027.1 39.54 10,027.1 36.34
LIVESTOCK 4 
INUR 2.818.4 13.46 3,482.0 13.72 4,116.3 16.05 4,270.1
*
15.20 3,897.3 14.14 2,403.3 10.19 2,359.0 9.30 2,423.9 8.78
FISHERIES 1,012.1 4.83 1,644.8 6.48 1,819.3 7.10 2,397.1 8.53 1,654.6 6.00 1,319.2 5.59 2,533.3 9.99 2,698.4 9.78
FORESTRY 1,607.4 7.67 2,420.1 9.54 2,500.6 9.75 2,428.7 8.65 3,085.7 11.19 1,733.3 7.35 1,667.2 E.58 1,200.2 4.35
GRAND TOTAL 20,346.4 100-0 25,376.6 100.0 25,648.8 100.0 28,035.7 180.0 27,570.1 100.0 23,580.5 100.0 25,356.4 100.0 27,592.9 100.0
a/ SSLA loans cannot be disaggregated by cosaodity.
Source: ACPC Year End Credit Report
Table 9
cont'n.
1938 1939 1990 Average Average
 ------------    Aeount Share
Aaount 8 Sure Asount 8 Shan iao e t 8 Shan
CROPS 19,115.6 66.76 20,650.5 66.62 25,154.4 61.88 19,307.7 70.11
Rice 3,084.6 10.44 3,679.0 11.79 5,416.7 13.32 2,247.0 7.71
Corn 471.9 1.60 655.2 2.10 602.9 1.48 333.7 1.15
Coconut 3,633.0 12.30 1,527.5 4.39 3,104.9 7.64 2,740.3 10.17
Sugarcane 5,963.3 20.19 6,536.6 20.95 6,238.2 15.35 6,433.0 23.64
Other Crops 6,363.0 22.22 6,452.2 27.09 9,791.8 24.09 7,553.7 27.24
LIVESTOCK 6
POOLTBT 3,559.4 12.05 4,619.9 14.60 7,815.6 19.23 3,796.9 13.36
fisheries 4,576.5 15.50 4,222.7 13.53 5,685.4 13.99 2,687.6 9.21
fWSTK 1,631.0 5.69 1,512.8 4.85 1,993.8 4.90 1,984.6 7.32
GBAND TOTAL 29,532.5 100.0 31,205.9 100.0 41,292.1 100.OO 27,835.3 100.00
LA
LOANS GRANTED TO FISHERIES BY INSTITUTION, 1986-1990 
(Amount in million pesos)
Table 10
Institution 1936 X Share 1987 X Share 1968 X Share 1989 X Share 1990 X Share
image
Share
PUB 3.5 0.1 3.0 0.1 45.5 1.0 63.6 1.5 59.8 0.9 8.7
DBP * 17.5 0.6 48.1 1.1 19.9 0.5 18.1 0.2 9.5
IBP % 18.6 0.7 61:1 1.3 458.6 10.9 440.8 7.8 4.1
PKBs 2,196.3 96.5 2,144.0 79.5 3,945.7 86.2 3,158.2 74.8 4,669.8 82.0 81.8
SHBs 26.4 1.0 3.9 9.4 16.3 0.4 54.7 1.3 7.5 0.1 0.6
PDBs 93.6 3.9 240.6 8.9 213.2 4.7 203.8 4.8 215.8 3.8 5.2
KBs 213.5 9.4 264.9 9.8 246.6 5.4 263.9 6.2 299.6 5.3 7.0
SSLhs a/ t t * t t '
TOTAL 2,533.3 100.9 2,698.4 100.8 4,578.5 109.0 4,222.7 199.0 5,685.4 100.9 100.0
I - data not available 
a/  - SSLA loans cannot be disaggregated.
Source: Credit Trends, igricultural Credit Policy Connell.
37
5) Rediscounting of promissory notes and other eligible credit instruments by the 
Central Bank at the following preferential rates:
a) 100 percent of the loan value o f  the outstanding balance under supervised 
credit programs,
b) A charge of one percent per annum rediscount and interest rates under the 
supervised credit programs, and
c) A charge of five percent per annum for other eligible instrum ents not 
under the supervised credit programs;
6) Determination of the loan ceiling to a single borrower depending on (a) ac­
tual need, (b) the viability o f the project to be financed, and (c) the capacity of 
the borrower to pay;
7) Intensification of government fisheries credit programs through the provision of 
m aximum DBP financial assistance for its Countryside Development Program 
and PN B’s mobile banking concept;
8) Creation of the Presidential Commitfee on Agricultural Credit and the Technical 
Board for Agricultural Credit to oversee the channeling o f scarce credit re 
sources to areas where they will generate the greatest social and economic 
benefits;
9) Fostering of credit consciousness and responsible attitudes in the rural areas 
through the establishment of the National Commission on Countryside Credit 
Credit and Collection; .
10) Introduction of the “ selda”  system which assumes the joirit-liability concept to 
enhance more cooperative effort among farmers; and
11) Enhancement of regional reinvestment of deposits by allotting 75 percent of the 
total deposits generated from commercial and thrift savings banks, stock sav 
ings and loan associations, etc., in a particular region for reinvestment in the 
area.
Credit Programs! Schemes. Credit programs in the past for the fisheries sector were implemented 
through various government agencies and government-owned or controlled banks. The institutions 
involved were: (a) the Development Bank of the Philippines, a government-owned bank which 
im plem ented a credit financing scheme with support from the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Developm ent (IBRD); (b) the rural banks and savings and loans associations which served as conduits 
o f the Central Bank—IBRD rural credit projects; (c) the Philippine National Bank; (d) the Land Bank 
o f the Philippines; (e) the National Agriculture and Fishery Council (NAFC); (f) The Development 
Academy o f the Philippines (DAP); (g) the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources; and (h) the 
defunct Agriculture Credit Administration (ACA).
A major Constraint to the designing of the credit programs was that, unlike rice farming, fishing 
was not adaptable to a single-project financing scheme for nationwide promotion (Samson 1978). This 
was due to: (a) varied types of culture and capture, (b) varied resources and markets in each area, and 
(c) the need to encourage indigenous technology in each area.
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The special credit programs initiated for the fishery sector were generally biased towards the 
municipal fishing sector. The major credit programs that catered specifically to the aquaculture industry 
were: (a) the Small Fishermen Credit Fund (SFCF); (b) the Small Foreshore and River Fisherman 
Program of DBP and PNB; (c) the Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK) Aquamarine Program of 
the M inistry of Human Settlements; (d) the Coastal Area Resources and Enterprise Development 
Project; and (e) the Laguna de Bay Fishpen Development Project (LBFDB).
The SFCF program was jointly managed by the Central Bank, LBP, NAFC and DAP. It was a 
five-year program launched in 1979 aimed at an integrated approach to the development of the fishing 
industry, primarily municipal and aquaculture fisheries. The program included (a) the provision of 
fishing equipment, fishing gear and paraphernalia, and fishing boats; (b) the construction of infrastruc­
ture, in-plants and cold storage facilities; and (c) the provision of the operating capital o f farmers’ 
associations or cooperatives. Out of an initial fund of P2 million, P I million was earmarked for the 
Supervised Fisheries Credit Program (SFCP) channelled through the rural banking system. Financial 
assistance to fishponds and fishpen operators was given on a short-term basis.
The Small Foreshore and River Fisherman Program of DBP and PNB, launched in 1976, was the 
most ambitious fisheries credit program to extend credit to small-scale fishermen/fishfarmers. The 
program released loans totaling P400 million. A major prerequisite of the program was for the borrowers 
to fo rm 11 seldas,”  or groups of fishermen, composed of five members per group who were to exert peer 
pressure on loan delinquents.
The KKK Aquamarine Program was a major part of the national rural development program of 
the former M inistry of Human Settlements. The program, which was launched in 1979, included the 
financing of aquamarine prototype projects such as fish cages, seafarming, fish culture, fish capture and 
fish processing. Though primarily for production loan, the program was also used to finance prawns and 
tilapia hatcheries and milkfish nurseries. The program had extended a total of P 4 11.42 million to 47,202 
borrowers as of 1986 (BFAR 1986).
The Coastal Area Resources Land Enterprise Development Project was a jo in t undertaking of 
NEDA, NAFC and the Philippine Fisheries Development Authority (PFDA) geared prim arily to the 
development of the country’s fishery resources. The program provided a package of credit, infrastruc­
ture and marketing support to fishermen in specific areas (Palawan, Samar, Sorsogon and Masbate). The 
target beneficiaries were the fishpond and fishpen operators, oyster and mussel growers, and small 
fishermen. A total fund of PI 00 million was provided for the period 1981-84.
The LBFDP which lasted for about eight years (1978-86) sought to develop 2,500 hectares of 
fishpen modules in Laguna Lake. Its main beneficiaries were fishfarmers culturing milkfish and tilapia. 
The project was jointly financed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and The Overseas Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) for US$15.8 million.
Another major fishery program of the government was the Biyayang Dagat Program (BDP) 
which lasted for about seven years from September 1979 to 1986. The program was primarily for small- 
and medium-scale municipal fishermen. However, until 1982 it provided short-term loans for fishpond 
production inputs and other aquaculture projects. As of 1986, the program had released a total of P 101.7
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million in loans, benefiting 7,619 borrowers (BFAR 1986). The Agricultural Credit Administration, 
then a credit agency of the government, had no credit programs for aquaculture, and its focus was mainly 
the municipal fishermen.
A summary o f the features o f the financing programs for aquaculture undertaken by major banks 
is shown in Table 11. It might be noted that DBP and LBP provided long-term loans while rural banks 
and the PNB lent on a short-term basis.
An evaluation of these credit policies and interventions indicated that they did not favorably 
work for the fisheries industry and the aquaculture subsector as well (TBAC 1976). This was attributed 
to the following reasons:
1. Inadequate loan size. Due to rising input prices and operational costs, prescribed loan sizes 
were not adequate to effectively support fisheries projects. The fishery credit programs were not availed 
of by fishfarmers owning less than 15 hectares (the estimated breakeven size). The actual beneficiaries 
were the big aquaculture fishfarmers who, ironically, found tine loan to be inadequate.
2. Collateral requirements. Almost all existing programs required a collateral. But this security 
imposition hardly assisted small fishfarmers who had no collateral to offer. In addition, fishpond lease 
agreement holders were scarcely qualified to borrow. This, in effect, made the program accessible only 
to the propertied and large fishermen.
3. Burdensome restructuring policy. The restructuring policy was burdensome for loan borrow­
ers. Aside from  having to pay interest, they were charged an additional penalty on their outstanding loan 
balance. This arrangement exemplified rigidities in the amortization of loans to fisheries that did not 
correspond to the intricacies of the fisheries sector. The amortization schedule imposed by banks did not 
correspond to the cash flow of the project, especially considering unforeseen risks.
4. High transaction costs. High transaction costs incurred in securing a loan also deterred credit 
availments. Filing fees, attorneys’ fees, transport costs to and from the bank, time spent and other loan- 
related expenditures constituted the bulk of these costs. All these discouraged prospective borrowers 
from availing themselves o f loans from formal sources. Instead they borrowed from private moneylend­
ers at higher interest rates but at lower transactional expenses.
5. Low  repayments. A low repayment rate was experienced by the majority o f formal lending 
institutions engaged in aquaculture financing. Reasons cited for this were poor production, inadequate 
inputs, low technology level, management deficiencies, insufficient technical manpower, and the lack 
of marketing and infrastructure support.
C. Current Credit Policies and Programs
The fisheries sector continues to be a priority concern of the government. However, with the 
general failure of past credit and financing strategies, alternative forms of managing and channeling 
credit to the rural markets are being sought. The new orientation in Philippine rural financial policy is 
towards minimum government intervention in the provision o f credit and a greater role o f market forces
FINANCING PROGRAMS FOR AQUACULTURE, BY INSTITUTION AND BY MATURITY
Table 11
Eligible Interest taunt Tens of
Loan Title Purpose Borrosers Bate of Lo’an Collateral Payment
Production
1. Development Bank of the 
Philippines
1.1 Fish Culture a. Behabilitatlon of 
daiaged fishponds
b. Construction of 
nes fisbposds
c. Development of 
existing fishponds
2. Philippine fationai Bank
2.1 Behabilitation of 
damaged fishpoods and 
fishpens bp floods 
and typhoons
a. repair of dikes/pens
b. purchase of 
fingerlings, inputs, 
etc.
a. those engaged in 
inland fishing 
industry
b. those intending
to engage in inland 
fishery production
a. operators of 
fishpens
b. fishpond 
operators
a. 12S p.a. for 
unsercured loans 
of PMOO end belou
b. ltt p.a. for 
secured lota of 
P5,0B0 and above
a. 121 p.a.
Based on actual 
needs of the
a. Hot ex­
ceeding 7(H 
of appraised 
value of real
securities and 
iiprovenents
not exceeding 
SDK of the 
appraisei value 
of chattels
real estate/
chattel
aortgages
b. leasehold 
rights
a. real estate 
properties
b. chattels
a. 7-10 years for 
rehabilitation
b. 13-16 years for 
construction of neu 
fisheries
c. 10-13 years for 
developnent
one year
Loan Title Purpose
Eligible
Borrowers
Interest
Bate
Amount 
of Loan Collateral
Terms of 
Payment
3. fiural Banking System
3.1 Short-term a. enhance fish a. experienced 12* pa.a. a. P300S/ha. real estate one year
financing program for production fishpond operators maximum for chattel
fisheries production with not more than 5 brackish water mortgage
and development b. provide operating hectare? fully fishpond for
capital. developed fishpond bangus and
sugpo combination
b. fishpen operators
with not more than b. PTOOO/borrower
3000 square meters maximum for
of tilapia culture bangus fishpen
and P3,300 per
c. fishermen engaged 1,000 sq. m.
in fry collection for tilapia
c. PSOO/borrower
maxim for
fry collector
Land Bank of the Philippines
4.1 short-term a. purchase of fry a. individuals a. 9* p.a. for lorn based on actual a. real estate 1-5 years
fisheries loan below P5.00Q needs
b. initial operating b. partnerships or b. chattels
capital corporations at b. 12* p.a. for
least 60* of which loans above c. securities
are Filipino equity
Loan Title Purpose
Eligible
Borrouers
Interest
Bate
tnount 
of Loan Collateral
Terns of 
Paysent
Marketing and Processing
1. Developaent Bank of the Philippines
1.1 on-fart
post-harvest 
processing equipient 
and facilities
a. construction of 
ice-naking storage and 
other facilities
a. those experienced 
in fishing business 
iilth ongoing storage 
and processing 
concern
a. 12X p.a. covered 
by land collateral
a. 80S of 
appraised value 
of titled 
collateral and 
BOS of untitled
b. 60S of 
appraised value 
of building, 
■achinery k 
equipment
a. m l estate
b. chattels
10-13 years
2. Land Bank of the Philippines
2.1 On-fara 
post-harvest 
processing equipaent 
and facilities, 
•arketing and 
processing
a. cold storage financing
b. uarehousing
c. purchase of trucks
d. salting and drying 
facilities
e. packaging
a. those engaged in 
amr of the on-farn 
post-harvest 
activities
s. l a  p.a. a. Pi.OH and 
beloo snll-scale
n. over P1.08 
and under P4.0 H 
for nediun-scale
c. over P4.0 H 
for large scale
a. real estate 
10-15 yrs.
b. Chattels
c. securities
Source: TBiC, ffational Horkshop on Aquaculture Development Strategies, Tropical Falance, Metro Hanila, tug. 2-4, I9T8.
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and private institutions in the allocation of financial resources. It specifically calls for the mobilization 
of deposits by the private banking system and for efficient financial intermediation in cognizance of the 
view that financial liberalization by itself is not a sufficient condition to increase the flow o f credit to 
the rural sector ( Lamberte and Lim 1987).
One o f the most important changes that occurred was the creation of the Comprehensive 
Agricultural Loan Fund (CALF), which was a consolidation of the funds o f the previous commodity 
specific credit programs. The CALF instituted various credit and credit guarantee schemes that were 
expected to be more responsive to the needs of the rural sector.
Of those schemes the four most important are: First, the credit guarantee which aims to 
encourage banks to lend to the rural sector by reducing the default risks generally associated with small 
farmer agricultural credit. This is made possible by government guaranteeing at m ost 85 percent of the 
risk exposure of the banks to the targeted beneficiaries. The scheme is operated through the facilities of 
three existing guarantee institutions: (a) the Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation (PCIC), which 
provides a guarantee for small farmer production credit; (b) the Quedan Guarantee Fund Board (QGFB), 
which provides a guarantee to cover the inventory financing of storable crops; and (c) the Guarantee 
Fund for Small and Medium Enterprises (GFSME), which provides a guarantee to small and medium 
enteiprises for medium-term credit. The status o f CALF guarantee coverage is presented in Table 12. 
Among the three guarantee institutions, the GFSM E is noted to have guaranteed the highest volume of 
loans for the aquaculture sector. Second, the management by CALF of the Integrated Rural Financing 
(IRF) Program in coordination with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). The IRF, begun in 1983, 
continues to operate in light o f its moderate success during the first phase. The program has two distinct 
features: (a) it employs the comprehensive credit line approach for small farm  households through the 
rural banking system and cooperatives; and (b) it emphasizes institutional development, which is 
focused on organizing and strengthening small farmers through participating nongovernmental organi­
zations (NGOs). The farmers are first trained in basic enterprise management and value formation prior 
to the availment of bank credit. Third is the Development Assistance Program for Cooperatives and 
People’s Organization (DAPCOPO) which was launched in May 1990. DAPCOPO is a short-term 
program created to bring the small farmers into the mainstream of the financial system via cooperatives 
and similar organizations. This program is for those farmers with good projects who do not have access 
as yet to bank credit due to the lack o f a credit record, collateral and familiarity with the banking system. 
The objective is to provide the fanners with first-hand experience in credit handling which will create 
credit records for them and enable them later to gain access to the financial system ’s resources. It also 
envisages the evolution o f cooperatives into strong financial conduits that would be able to compete with 
the banking system. Fourth is the Fisheries Sector Program (FSP). The program, which is implemented 
by the Department o f Agriculture through a loan from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), consists of 
a package o f policy and institutional reforms and program activities designed to improve the production 
of the coastal and aquaculture sector. This package has six components, namely: (a) fishery resource and 
ecological assessment, (b) coastal resource and management, (c) research and extension, (d) law 
enforcement, (e) infrastructure and marketing support, and (f) credit.
Credit is delivered through the IRF credit delivery system of the ACPC-LBP wherein coopera­
tives and rural banks retail the loans provided through the LBP. Private banks are encouraged to lend 
to the sector out o f their own resources under guarantee by the PCIC-CALF and the GFSME-CALF,
Table 12
STATUS OF CALF GUARANTEE COVERAGE, BY TYPE OF COMM ODITY
Loan Amount 
C overed (FM)
P e rc e n t  S h are
FCIC-CALF 635,911 3 2 .2
Commercial Crops 38#.378 19 .5
V eg e ta b le s 121.216 6 .2
L iv e s to c k 34 .372 1 .7
F r u i t s 28 .274 1 .4
R oo tc rops 29 .332 1 .5
F is h e ry  a / 22 .012 1 .1
O th ers 13.327 0 .8
QGFB-CALF 1 ,0 85 .665 5 5 .0
Sugar 391.337 19 .8
Meat P ro d u c ts 293.000 14 .9
C o ffee 107.632 5 .5
D ressed  C hicken 42.397 2 .1
Cacao Beans 40 .000 2 .0
P a la y /C o m 43 ,592 2 .2
O th e rs  b / 167.707 8 .5
GFSME-CALF 245.747 12 .5
V e g e ta b le  Farm ing 109.072 5 .5
Feed M ill in g 26.475 1 .3
Praw n/Bangus C u ltu re 24.830 1 .3
B r o i le r - C o n tr a c t  Growing 17.400 0 .9
Coco O il P ro c e s s in g 15.000 0 .8
G ra in s  T rad in g 10.913 0 .6
R ice  P ro d u c tio n 4 .939 0 .2
O th e rs  c / 37.118 1 .9
BPnB-CALF 5.436 0 .3
P u b lic  M arket 4 .680 0 .3
Lapu-Lapu C u ltu re 0 .500 *
T i la p i a  C u ltu re 0 .256 *
TOTAL 1 ,9 7 2 .7 5 9 100 .0nniiiiiiHU11II
*  N e g lig ib le
a /  M ainly  a q u a c u ltu re  -  f i s h  c a g e s , bangus/p raw n  and seaw eeds 
b /  In c lu d e s  praw ns and f i s h  p ro d u c ts  
c /  In c lu d e s  seaw eed fa rm in g , f i s h  c u l tu r e
S ource: A g r ic u l tu r a l  C r e d i t  P o l ic y  C o u n c il.
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which will expand their guarantee cover to include aquaculture, fishery and nonfishery related projects 
in the priority areas. Initial funding for the credit com ponent amounts to PI 00 million, and the program 
is set to be com pleted within the period 1990-94.
V. CONCLUSION: RESEARCH GAPS AND PRIORITIES
The projected credit requirements of the fisheries sector will amount to about-P31.0 billion for 
the five-year period 1991-95 (Rural Finance Development Plan 1990). This am ount seems understated 
because the esdm atesonly  considered production credit. There may be a higher credit demand in view 
of the rising cost o f fisheries inputs (e.g., pesticides, fertilizers, construction materials), especially the 
imported inputs which imply higher development, operating costs and capital investments. T he implem­
entation o f the CARP which reduces the effective rearing areas of ponds to only five hectares implies 
the adoption o f an intensive culture practice for the industry to remain viable. T h is cultural practice, as 
indicated earlier, requires an operating capital ten times more than that o f extensive or traditional culture.
The capital needs of the aquaculture sector are indeed huge. With funding as a m ajor constraint, 
a viable and efficient credit market that meets the industry’s requirement for investment capital, input 
purchase, crop financing and essential consumption expenditure of labor in the sector is imperative. 
W hile the preliminary and very limited information seems to point to the need for government 
intervention in various areas such as infrastructure, marketing and credit, this perception may be more 
apparent than real.
An understanding o f the aquaculture sector is essential, for it is not enough to know the 
socioeconomic conditions o f the fishfarmer. It is equally im portant to have a better and improved 
understanding o f the economics o f production and marketing of fisheries products and o f the impact of 
factors (e.g., CARP) that bear on the profitability and viability o f the sector.
A critical area is the policy environment affecting the aquaculture sector. For instance, we must 
have a clear understanding of the likely impact of agrarian reform as well as o f a host o f macro policies, 
in particular, trade and  financial policies. Such policies affect the marketability of produce especially 
for the exported products, the cost of operation, and the availability of financial resources. The CARP, 
which limits farm size to five hectares, would have a direct effect on the tenancy arrangement and on 
the production and cost structure, resulting in changes in output and employment. Considering that tl\e 
aquaculture indusdy in the country is characterized by an increasing cost structure, economies o f scale 
may require a larger farm size (i.e., more than five hectares) for the industry to remain viable. An 
agrarian reform program may therefore bring about serious repercussions to the industry, which can be 
aggravated by the resultant decrease in formal institutions’ lending activity to the sector due to the higher 
risks posed by small aquaculture farms.
The reluctance o f formal financial institutions to lend to the small fishfarmers would increase the 
sector’s dependence on informal institutions characterized by high interest rates and “ interlinked”  
arrangements that may put the fishfarmers at a disadvantaged position.
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Lastly, the financial concerns of the CARP beneficiaries need to be addressed because the highly 
capital-intensive nature of the industry and the sensitivity of aquaculture output to quality inputs 
underscore the demand for financial resources.
There is thus a need to study past and existing aquaculture credit programs/schemes in the 
country to draw lessons from their failure or success. The apparent lack of systematic studies on the 
structure, nature and characteristics of the fisheries credit markets, in general, and of small-scale 
aquaculture, in particular, limits the ability to make long-range investment plans and appropriate credit 
policies and programs for the sector. Specifically, some credit issues that need to be addressed are: (a) 
whether it is necessary to adopt specialized credit facilities; (b) the proper incentive structure to create;
(c) whether credit schemes should be used as channels of government’s welfare objectives; and (d) 
whether loan guarantees will be more effective than subsidized credit insofar as inducing credit 
availability and accessibility is concerned. Until problems or barriers to credit financing of the sector are 
well understood and properly addressed, the sector will remain undercapitalized, with resultant adverse 
effects on investment and output.
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